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Abstract 
We examined whether typical developmental trends in suggestion-induced false memories (i.e., 
age-related decrease) could be changed. Using theoretical principles from the spontaneous false 
memory field, we adapted two often-used false memory procedures: misinformation (Experiment 
1) and memory conformity (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, 7/9-year old children (n = 33) and 
adults (n = 39) received stories containing associatively-related details. They then listened to 
misinformation in the form of short narrative preserving the meaning of the story. Children and 
adults were equally susceptible to the misinformation effect. In Experiment 2, younger (7/8-year-
olds, n = 30) and older (11/12-year-olds, n = 30) children and adults (n = 30) viewed pictures 
containing associatively-related details. They viewed these pictures in pairs. Although the 
pictures differed, participants believed they had viewed the same pictures. Participants had to 
report what they could recollect during collaborative and individual recall tests. Children and 
adults were equally susceptible to memory conformity effects. When correcting for response 
bias, adults’ false memory scores were even higher than children’s. Our results show that age 
trends in suggestion-induced false memories are not developmentally invariant.  
 
Keywords: False Memory; Developmental Reversal; Development; Misinformation; Memory 
Conformity 
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Eliminating Age Differences in Children’s and Adults’ Suggestibility and Memory 
Conformity Effects 
In court, it is generally assumed that children are more likely to fall prey to suggestive 
pressure and false memory formation than adults (e.g., Brackmann, Otgaar, Sauerland, & Jelicic, 
in press; Bruck & Ceci, 1999). Consistent with this assumption, research on suggestion-induced 
false memories (where witnesses receive incorrect information about an experienced event) 
shows that although both children and adults are susceptible to these memory illusions, children 
tend to be more susceptible than adults (Bruck & Ceci, 1999).  However, these developmental 
trends are reversed when spontaneously-induced1 false memories are examined (Howe, Wimmer, 
Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009).  Specifically, one of most frequently used methods to elicit 
spontaneously-induced false memories is by using the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) 
paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) where participants receive word lists 
containing associatively-related concepts (e.g., hill, summit, Alps). In this paradigm, both 
children and adults not only remember some of the presented words but they also falsely 
remember other non-presented, associatively related theme words (i.e., the critical lure, 
mountain).  Importantly, adults are more susceptible to these spontaneous memory illusions than 
children (Howe et al., 2009).  
In the current experiments, we examined developmental trends in two paradigms 
frequently used to induce suggestion-induced false memories: misinformation (Experiment 1) 
and memory conformity (Experiment 2). Our main interest was to see whether we could reverse 
or at least attenuate developmental trends in suggestion-induced false memories to levels akin to 
the developmental reversals observed with spontaneous false memories (e.g., age-related 
increase rather than decrease).  Suggestion-induced false memories frequently occur in the 
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misinformation paradigm.  Here, participants experience an event (e.g., witness a staged-crime) 
and are then presented with misinformation about that event in which a number of false details 
are suggested (e.g., that the robber used a gun) as having been present in the witnessed event. 
Typically, a significant minority of participants accept the misinformation as being part of the 
original event (a false memory) and this misinformation effect is more prevalent in younger than 
in older children and adults (Otgaar, Candel, Smeets, & Merckelbach, 2010; Sutherland & 
Hayne, 2001).  
In the memory conformity paradigm pairs of participants view two slightly different 
versions of an event but are under the impression that they are viewing the same event. They 
then engage in an interactive discussion about what they have seen during the event. Studies 
using this procedure demonstrate that participants report having seen information that was 
mentioned by the co-witness but that was not actually in the event they themselves witnessed. 
Developmental work on memory conformity effects have produced results that are somewhat 
mixed.  For example, Candel, Memon, and Al-Harazi (2007) compared conformity effects in 
7/8- and 11/12-year-olds and found an age-related increase in memory errors for free recall but 
an age-related decrease for cued recall.  Other research has found only limited support for age-
related changes in the memory conformity effect (McGuire, London, & Wright, 2011, 2015). 
However, in these latter studies, 11- to 21-year-olds were tested and age differences in false 
memories are not always found in this age range (Brainerd, Reyna, & Ceci, 2008; Howe et al., 
2009; Otgaar, Howe, Brackmann, & Smeets, 2016). 
Explanations concerning developmental differences in false memories include Fuzzy-
trace Theory (FTT; Brainerd et al., 2008) and Associative-activation Theory (AAT; Howe et al., 
2009; Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Smeets, & Moritz, 2014). FTT suggests that false memories occur 
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when people rely on the underlying meaning of an event. As the ability to extract meaning 
improves with age, FTT predicts that false memories should increase with age. Alternatively, 
AAT posits that false memories arise because of the spread of associative activation among 
related concepts that were not experienced. Because the structure and content of one’s 
knowledge base changes with age, activation will spread faster and more automatically across 
development in childhood. Like FTT, AAT predicts that false memories increase with age. 
Furthermore, AAT states that because children’s knowledge base is less well-developed than that 
of adults’, they will benefit to a greater extent from stimuli that contain obvious themes such as 
pictures (e.g., of a beach). That is, when such stimuli are presented – as the current experiments 
have done – children can more easily extract meaning of such stimuli thereby rivaling false 
memory rates of adults.  
We recently established that the standard developmental trend (i.e., age-related decrease) 
in suggestion-induced false memories can change when relying on meaning-based manipulations 
derived from AAT and FTT (Otgaar et al., 2016). In four experiments, we showed that when 
participants receive associatively-related stimuli and are then exposed to suggestive information 
that preserves the meaning of the event, susceptibility to misinformation increased, not 
decreased, with age. This finding seems counterintuitive, as the majority of research on 
developmental misinformation research has revealed that younger children are more susceptible 
to suggestion-based false memories than older children and adults. Our previous research 
suggests that if we adapt the misinformation procedure in a more meaning-based procedure, the 
standard false memory trend (i.e., age-related decrease) will change. Also, in most forensic cases 
where misinformation has been suggested to witnesses, these suggestions contain meaning-
related details that did not actually occur in the original event. Therefore, our findings are not 
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only critical theoretically, but from an applied perspective, it is important to acknowledge that 
age is perhaps not the best predictor when evaluating witness’ susceptibility to suggestive 
pressure and the formation of false memories.   
Although probative, these findings are somewhat limited as they are confined to one false 
memory procedure. Indeed, there is considerable debate about whether different false memory 
procedures elicit the same type of false memory (Wade et al., 2007). Therefore, in order to 
provide a more convincing case that age differences in suggestion-induced memory illusions are 
not developmentally invariant, we need to show that trends in false memories can be attenuated 
or reversed across a variety of different misinformation procedures.  The current experiments 
will do just that, making these developmental false memory findings more domain-general. Put 
simply, in order to demonstrate that the malleability of development trends in suggestion-
induced false memory is not paradigm-dependent, we need to assess the generalizability of these 
effects across different suggestibility paradigms. 
The Current Experiments 
To do this, we present two experiments using different false memory paradigms that are 
frequently employed in memory research and in which false memories are induced via 
suggestion (Loftus, 2005; Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, & Gabbert, 2009). Specifically, we 
adapted the misinformation (Experiment 1) and memory conformity (Experiment 2) paradigms 
so that they paralleled the meaning-based manipulations found in spontaneous false memory 
paradigms. The general prediction across experiments was that when participants receive 
associatively-related (mis)information, these related, non-presented details will be falsely 
remembered. Moreover, the standard developmental trend in suggestion-induced false memories 
will be reversed or at least, attenuated.  
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Experiment 1: DRM Stories and Suggestibility Effects 
Recent research has shown that when DRM lists are embedded in stories they can easily 
give rise to false memories (Howe & Wilkinson, 2011; Otgaar et al., 2014). Because younger 
children’s associative networks are less well developed and more poorly integrated than older 
children’s and adults’, younger children should particularly benefit from material containing an 
obvious theme (stories), something which in turn, should give rise to more false memories.  
Indeed, studies using DRM-based stories have found that developmental reversal effects become 
attenuated (Howe & Wilkinson, 2011) or even reversed (Otgaar et al., 2014). Therefore, in 
Experiment 1, we presented children and adults with DRM stories and then suggested that a 
related item (i.e., the critical lure) also had been present. One would expect that providing 
suggestions about information that is consistent with a now more obvious story theme should 
increase misinformation acceptance rates in younger children. If true, then typical developmental 
trends in suggestion-induced false memories (i.e., age-related decrease) should be attenuated or 
perhaps even reversed.  
A subsidiary aim of Experiment 1 was to examine the role of emotion on the 
development of suggestion-induced false memories. Although reversal effects have appeared for 
both neutral and emotionally negative false memories (e.g., Howe, Candel, Otgaar, Malone, & 
Wimmer, 2010), there is evidence showing that negative suggestion-induced false memories are 
more likely to show reversal effects than neutral suggestion-induced false memories (e.g., Otgaar 
et al., 2016). Thus, we used stories that varied in emotion such that some were neutral and others 
negative. 
Method 
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Before Experiment 1 could be conducted, we needed to pilot the DRM stories and show 
that children were less likely to grasp the meaning of the stories than adults. In this experiment, 
40 7/9-year-olds (mean age = 7.75, SD = .63, range: 7-9), 49 10/12-year-olds (mean age = 10.71, 
SD = .54, range: 10-12), and 40 adults (mean age = 21.13, SD = 2.19, range: 18-27) were 
presented with either 6 DRM lists or the same stimuli converted into 6 stories (see below for 
detailed information about the materials). After the presentation of these stimuli, participants 
received a recognition including presented and non-presented (critical lure) items. We found a 
significant main effect of age (F(2, 123) = 19.41, p < .001,  ŋ²partial = .24) with younger children 
(M = .39, SD = .33; List: M = .36, 95% CI [.26 - .49]; Story: M = .41, 95% CI [.30 - .52]) falsely 
remembering statistically fewer items than the older children (M = .69, SD = .21; List: M = .67, 
95% CI [.57 - .77]; Story: M = .72, 95% CI [.62 - .83]) and adults (M = .70, SD = .22; List: M = 
.70, 95% CI [.59 - .81]; Story: M = .70, 95% CI [.58 - .81]) thereby demonstrating a 
developmental reversal effect for both lists and stories. No statistically significant Age x 
Stimulus (List vs Story) interaction was found (F(2, 123) = 0.17, p = .84,  ŋ²partial = .003).  
Participants 
 Thirty-three 7/9-year-olds and 39 adults participated in this experiment.  One child was 
omitted because she turned out to be 6 years old, leaving the final sample consisting of 32 7/9-
year-olds (mean age = 7.53, SD = 0.62; range: 7-9) and 39 adults (mean age = 20.67, SD = 1.26; 
range: 19–24). An à-priori power analysis with a power of 0.80 and a medium effect size (f =  
0.375; ŋ²partial = 0.13) resulted in a sample size of 68 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). 
We stopped with data collection after testing a total of 72 participants in case of potential 
dropouts. All children had parental consent and assented on the day of testing. Adult participants 
were undergraduates from the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University. 
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They received a financial compensation (7.50 euro) or course credits for their participation. The 
experiment was approved by the standing ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and 
Neuroscience, Maastricht University. 
Design  
A 2 (Age: 7/9-year-olds vs. adults) x 2 (Emotion: neutral vs. negative) split-plot design 
was used in this experiment.  Participants received two neutral and two negative stories with the 
order of presentation counterbalanced across participants.  
Materials and Procedure 
Four DRM lists (2 neutral: bread, foot; 2 negative: pain, cry) were drawn from a larger 
pool (see Howe et al., 2010) and have been used in previous false memory research (e.g., Howe 
et al., 2010; Otgaar, Peters, & Howe, 2012).  Each list consisted of 10 words selected from the 
Dutch word association norms (Van Loon-Vervoorn & Van Bekkum, 1991).  Using the CELEX 
lexical database, we made sure that the mean word frequency of the neutral and emotional 
critical lures did not differ (t(8) = 0.22, p > .05).  Also, the mean backward associative strength 
(BAS) between the neutral words and their critical lures and the mean BAS between the 
emotional words and their critical lures did not differ (t(8) = 1.69, p > .05).  The DRM words 
were embedded in a story.  Story length was roughly the same across stories (range: 119-151 
words).  Here is an English translated example of a Dutch DRM story using the “bread” critical 
lure (DRM words are underlined): 
“‘Big’ Bertha was the daughter of the baker.  Her name was actually just Bertha, but 
because she loved butter and sweet fillings, she became a bit bigger in weight.  Her mouth was 
often brown from chocolate.  Her classmates gave her that nickname and she did not care.  She 
was proud of the profession of her father.  In the morning, she looked with interest how he made 
SUGGESTIBILITY AND MEMORY CONFORMITY 
 
 10 
dough.  He told her how you make flour from wheat.  Using a knife, he often cut a piece for her.  
He asked her if she could taste the type of grain. Bertha was sure that she wanted to become like 
her father when she got older.” 
 We used the standard misinformation procedure containing an encoding phase, 
misinformation phase, and a memory test (Loftus, 2005). Participants were told that they had to 
listen and pay attention to some stories. They were then presented with two stories. The stories 
were audio-recorded. After the presentation of two of the stories, participants heard some 
misinformation about those stories.  Participants then heard another two stories and afterwards 
received suggestive pressure in the form of misinformation about those two stories. The 
misinformation was also audio-recorded. Misinformation consisted of a short narrative about 
someone who presumably also heard the two stories.  In the narrative for each story, 4 of the 
originally presented items and 1 misinformed item (the critical lure) were mentioned.  There 
were two misinformation versions, one for neutral stories (bread, foot) and one for negative 
stories (pain, cry). The order of stories (neutral vs. negative) was counterbalanced.  Here is an 
example of a neutral story where misinformation occurred after the presentation of two stories 
(the words in bold represent the misinformation of the critical lures): 
“I have just heard a story about the daughter of a baker.  She really liked bread.  She is 
fond of sweet fillings.  Early in the morning she saw how her father made dough.  She really 
liked this and when she was old enough, she also wanted to do this.  The second story was about 
Gertje.  I remember that he was running in the gym.  His toe was hurting.  He pulled off his shoe 
to look at his foot.  Then, he accidently hurt his leg and ankle.”  
After all stories were presented, a short distractor task was implemented that lasted 5 
minutes (playing Tetris).  Finally, a 33-word recognition task was presented containing 16 of the 
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presented items (4 from each story), 4 critical lures (1 from each story), 4 non-presented related 
items, and 9 unrelated items. Here, participants were asked whether they recognized (or did not 
recognize) words that were presented during the presentation of the original stories.  
Results and Discussion 
To eliminate possible age-related response biases, we transformed our scores using the 
two-high threshold correction (H - FA(U)) where H is the hit rate for presented items and FA(U) 
refers to false alarms of non-presented unrelated items (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988).  False 
alarms for critical lures were also corrected using (FA(CL) - FA(U)) where FA(CL) is the false 
alarm rate for critical lures.  Finally, false alarms for related items were transformed using 
(FA(R) - FA(U)) where FA(R) is the false alarm rate for non-presented related items. 
Hit rates 
Our mixed-measures ANOVA showed a significant Age x Emotion interaction (F(1, 70) 
= 9.96, p = .002,  ŋ²partial = .13).  Follow-up simple main effect analyses showed that only for the 
adults, neutral stories (M = .71, SD = .25) were better remembered than negative stories (M = 
.48, SD = .21; F(1, 38) = 41.02, p < .001,  ŋ²partial = .52).  For the children, this difference was not 
significant (F(1, 32) = 2.97, p = .09,  ŋ²partial = .09).  
False recognition 
Interestingly, no age effect emerged for false recognition (F(1,70) = 1.53, p = .22,  ŋ²partial 
= .02).  As expected, we found no evidence that children were more susceptible to suggestion-
induced false memories than adults.  That is, children (M = .84, SD = .15) and adults (M = .78, 
SD = .24) did not differ significantly in their false memory rates.  We also conducted a Bayesian 
analysis and found a Bayes Factor(10) of 0.40 which indicates that our data are more likely to 
support the null hypothesis (= no age difference) than the alternative hypothesis (= age 
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difference). We also found a statistically significant effect for emotion (F(1, 70) = 9.61, p = .003,  
ŋ²partial = .12) with higher false memory rates for the negative (M = .87, SD = .24) relative to the 
neutral stimuli (M = .74, SD = .28). No significant interaction emerged (F(1, 70) = 0.64, p = .43,  
ŋ²partial = .01; Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1 
Hits, False Recognition, and Non-presented Related Items as a Function of Age and Emotion 
(Means (Proportions) and Standard Errors (in Parentheses); Experiment 1). 
  
 
False alarms for related non-presented items 
Focusing our analyses on the non-presented related items, no interaction emerged 
(F(1,70) = 3.38, p = .07, ŋ²partial = .05) and there was no significant age effect (F(1, 70) = 1.60, p 
= .21 ŋ²partial = .02).  However, again we obtained a significant main effect of emotion (F(1, 70) = 
7.99, p = .006,  ŋ²partial = .10) with negative related items (M = .13, SD = .29) being more 
frequently recognized than neutral related items (M = 0.03, SD = 0.20).  
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This experiment demonstrates that development patterns in suggestion-based false 
memories can be modified when the materials used contain associatively related information.  As 
expected, we found that negative stimuli were more likely to engender false memories than 
neutral stimuli.  Importantly, we did not find evidence for an Age x Valence interaction showing 
that valence had an effect on false memory rates independent of age.  
Using a combined DRM/misinformation paradigm, our most important finding was that 
children and adults did not differ in their propensity to accept misinformation.  This is a hitherto 
unreported finding in the false memory literature that arose because we modified the 
misinformation paradigm in line with theoretical assumptions contained in models (i.e., AAT, 
FTT) of false memory that resulted in the reversal of developmental trends in suggestion-based 
false memories.  That is, because false memories rely on participants being able to extract the 
meaning of experiences, when conditions are created where the meaning is made obvious, even 
young children (7/9-year-olds) evince false memory rates that rival those of adults. The 
combined DRM/misinformation approach likely resulted in an attenuation of the developmental 
trend that is commonly found in suggestion-induced false memories  (false memories decrease 
with age).  However, an equally plausible explanation is that the presentation of misinformation 
caused an attenuated developmental reversal (false memories increase with age).  In our pilot 
experiment, we found that without misinformation, children had lower false memory rates than 
adults.  Experiment 1 showed that including misinformation in which the critical lure was 
included led to no differences in suggestion-induced false memory propensity. One might argue 
that our attenuation effect is due to young children’s susceptibility to accept misinformation in 
general. However, this is unlikely because then one would expect adults to be less prone to 
misinformation than children. This is not what we found. Our result is in line with our argument 
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that misinformation about story contexts might lead to more obvious themes, ones that would 
increase children’s but not adults’ false memory rates.  
 
Experiment 2: DRM and Memory Conformity Effects 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine whether an adaptation of the memory 
conformity paradigm could also lead to changes in the typical developmental trend for 
suggestion-induced false memories. Compared to developmental studies of suggestibility, there 
are only a few experiments on the development of memory conformity effects (Candel et al., 
2007; McGuire et al., 2015). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, these memory conformity 
experiments have produced mixed findings. One study (Candel et al., 2007) found evidence for 
developmental increases (for cued recall) and decreases (for free recall) in memory conformity 
effects while another study found developmental invariance in memory conformity effects 
(McGuire et al., 2015). There are several reasons why there are discrepancies across these 
studies, not the least of which was the use of an inappropriate age range to assess developmental 
differences in false memories (McGuire et al., 2015) or uncertainty as to whether the presented 
stimuli actually contained associatively-related details (Candel et al., 2007). 
In Experiment 2, we included more age groups (7/8-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, and 
adults) who were presented with neutral (e.g., kitchen) and negative (e.g., bicycle accident) 
pictures containing associatively-related details. These pictures were specifically constructed in 
line with how DRM wordlists are commonly developed (see below). Participants viewed these 
pictures in pairs and they believed they were viewing the same pictures. However, during this 
presentation, slightly different pictures were shown to the different individuals in the pairs. After 
viewing these different versions of the picture, participants had to recall what they could 
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remember both collaboratively in their pairs and then individually. The basic prediction was that 
the presentation of associatively-related stimuli would activate related, non-presented concepts 
which would be reported during the two recall sessions. Based on previous developmental 
memory conformity experiments, no specific predictions could be made concerning age effects. 
However, based on AAT and FTT, one might hypothesize that the presentation of such 
associatively-related material would lead to more false memories in adults than in children 
thereby evincing a developmental reversal effect.  
However, AAT provides an additional possibility which is that by presenting pictures 
with an obvious theme (e.g., kitchen), this should increase children’s false memory rates (Howe 
et al., 2009; Otgaar et al., 2014). The reason is that adults’ knowledge base is more developed 
and integrated than that of children’s. The presentation of pictures containing a clear theme 
would not lead to more false memories for adults but for children, this should help them to 
identify the theme and make additional (correct and incorrect) associations. Indeed, studies have 
revealed that stimili with obvious themes frequently elevate children’s false memory rates more 
than adults’ false memory rates (Howe & Wilkinson, 2010; Otgaar et al., 2014). Based on this, 
our adapted memory conformity procedure should also lead to changes in typical developmental 
trends in false memory rates.  
Method 
Participants 
 We conducted an à-priori power analysis with a medium effect size (f =  0.375, η2p =  
0.13) and high power (0.95) leading to a sample size of 87 (Faul et al., 2007). We tested 90 
participants consisting of 30 7/8-year-olds (M = 7.63, SD = 0.49, range = 7-8; 13 boys), 30 
11/12-year-olds (M = 11.50, SD = 0.51, range = 11-12; 16 boys), and 30 adults (M = 21.50, SD = 
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2.89, range = 18-31; 5 men). The children were recruited from Dutch primary schools, after 
parental consent and approval of their respective schools. Children received a small present for 
their involvement. The adults were all students from Maastricht University and were rewarded 
with course credit or a small financial compensation for their participation (7.50 euro). The 
current experiment was approved by the standing ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology 
and Neuroscience, Maastricht University. 
Materials 
 Pilot study. We conducted a pilot study to construct the necessary material for our 
experiment. Twenty-four undergraduate students (MAge = 21.92, SD =  2.10; 11 men) were asked 
to complete a form in which they were presented with 3 neutral (kitchen, school, desk) and 3 
negative (bicycle accident, prisoner, theft) descriptions of scenes. The instruction was to come up 
with as many details that were related to the scenes. They had to provide a minimum of five 
details for each scene and the task lasted approximately 12 minutes (2 minutes for each scene). 
The data were analyzed and we looked at details that were mentioned most often and earliest 
across participants.  Participants came up with many different items (N = 284). Those items that 
were mentioned most often were generally also mentioned the earliest and these items were used 
for the construction of pictures.  
 Pictures. Based on the pilot data, we selected 4 descriptions (2 neutral: kitchen and desk; 
2 negative: bicycle accident, prisoner) of which we devised pictures. Each picture contained 11 
or 12 associatively related details based on the details that were in the pilot indicated as most 
associated to the scene (e.g., desk: books, chair, laptop, note bloc, pencil, paper, telephone, 
marker, bottle of water, candy, case). For each of the pictures, two slightly different versions 
were constructed that diverged on critical items: Versions A and B.  Each picture version 
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included a critical item that was associatively related to the scene but not present in the other 
picture version. For all four pictures, this led to a total of 8 critical items. The pictures were 
presented for 20 seconds each with 4-second interstimulus intervals. Each member of a pair 
viewed a different picture version and thus saw the opposite picture versions of those that the 
other pair member was presented with. Pairs of participants were positioned at opposite sides of 
a table and received the pictures at the same time. Picture order and version was randomized per 
pair and each individual member of a pair viewed their pictures in the same order but received 
the opposite version. 
Design and Procedure 
 Experiment 2 used a 3 (Age: 7/8-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, and adults) x 2 (Emotion: 
neutral vs. negative) mixed design with the latter factor being a within-subject factor. Children 
were tested in quiet rooms at their elementary schools. The students were tested by two research 
administrators in quiet testing rooms at the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht 
University. Participants were always tested in pairs within their own age group. They were 
informed that they were involved in a memory experiment using pictures and different age 
groups.  
 Pictures were presented to pairs of participants. Participants unknowingly received 
pictures that were slightly different than those presented to the other pair member. After this, 
participants received a 5-min lasting distractor task (i.e., playing Tetris). Next, they were 
instructed to discuss and recall all of the details from the pictures that they could remember. 
Before the discussion, participants were instructed to reply to each other per mentioned detail, by 
indicating whether they did or did not remember that detail, or whether they were unsure. After 
the collaborative discussion, participants played Tetris once more for five minutes. Then, in 
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separate rooms each participant was instructed to individually recall what they remembered from 
the pictures as if they were a witness asked by the police to report what they had seen. 
Participants had to mention only those details that they themselves remembered from the 
pictures. Finally, participants were debriefed about the purpose of the study. 
Scoring 
 For the memory conformity paradigm, hits in recall were scored by the amount of 
correctly reported associatively-related details as a proportion of the total number of 
associatively-related details presented. Furthermore, we looked at the critical hits (reports of seen 
critical items). False critical recall (reports of critical items from the other picture versions) was 
also separately recorded and assigned one point per item. Finally, intrusions (false recall of items 
not present in either version of the pictures) were recorded as well.  
 
Results and Discussion 
 First, we present the proportion of hits and false memory rates. However, because 
intrusions were statistically higher in younger children than in older children and adults, we have 
also conducted analyses on corrected scores (see Exploratory Analyses). 
Memory Conformity: True Memory 
 We first examined the hit rates during the collaborative recall phase by using a 3 (Age: 
7/8-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, and adults) x 2 (Emotion: Neutral vs. negative) repeated 
measures ANOVA. Our analysis found a statistically significant Age x Emotion interaction (F(2, 
87) = 15.94, p < .001, η2p =  .27). Simple main effects showed that for all age groups, an emotion 
effect was observed (F(1, 87) = 203.05, p < .001, η2p =  .70) with higher hit rates for the negative 
(M = 0.70, SD = 0.08) than neutral pictures (M = 0.51, SD = 0.14). Second, for neutral hit rates 
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using post-hoc Bonferroni tests, we found that adults (M = .63, SD = 0.08) had statistically 
higher hit rates than 11/12-year-olds (M = 0.53, SD = 0.10) who in turn had statistically higher 
hit rates than 7/8-year-olds (M = 0.38, SD = 0.11; F(2, 87) = 51.84, p < .001, η2p =  .54). 
Although we also found a statistically significant age effect when only focusing on the negative 
hit rates (F(2, 87) = 6.78, p = .002, η2p =  .14), adults (M = 0.74, SD = 0.08) and 11/12-year-olds 
(M = 0.71, SD = 0.08; p = 0.42) did not differ statistically in their hit rates. Only younger 
children (M = 0.66, SD = 0.07) had lower hit rates than older children (p = .02) and adults (p < 
.001; Figure 2).  
 When we concentrated on hit rates during individual recall, we again found a statistically 
significant Age x Emotion interaction (F(2, 86) = 8.29, p = .001, η2p =  .16). When we performed 
simple effects tests, we found for the neutral hit rates (F(2, 86) = 41.89, p < .001, η2p =  .49), that 
adults had statistically higher scores (M = 0.61, SD = 0.09) than 11/12-year-olds (M = 0.48, SD = 
0.12) who in turn had higher scores than the youngest age group (M = 0.36, SD = 0.09, all ps < 
.001). Although similar effects were obtained for the negative hit rates (F(2, 86) = 13.71, p < 
.001, η2p =  .24), the effects were much smaller than for the neutral hit rates (η2p =  .49).  
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Figure 2 
Hits as a Function of Age and Emotion (Means and Standard Errors (in parentheses; Experiment 
2). 
 
Memory Conformity: False Memory  
 We conducted a 3 (Age: 7/8-year-olds, 11/12-year-olds, and adults) x 2 (Emotion: 
Neutral vs. negative) repeated measures ANOVA on the false memory rates during the 
collaborative recall phase. Interestingly, as in Experiment 1, false memory rates did not differ 
statistically between the different age groups (F(2, 86) = 2.68, p = .07, η2p =  .06; 7/8-year-olds: 
M = 0.33; 11/12-year-olds: M = 0.51; adults: M = 0.33). Indeed, we obtained a Bayes Factor(10) 
of 0.64 which implies that our data are more in favor of the null (= no age difference) than 
alternative hypothesis (= age difference). We found that negative false memory rates (M = 0.46, 
SD = 0.47) were statistically higher than neutral false memory rates (M = 0.31, SD = 0.45; F(1, 
86) = 5.57, p = .02, η2p =  .06). The interaction was not significant (F(2, 86) = 0.26, p = .77, η2p =  
.006). 
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 When we focused our analysis on the false memory rates during the individual recall 
phase, a somewhat similar age pattern was observed as for the collaborative false memory rates. 
That is, although an age effect was detected (F(2, 81) = 3.54, p = .03, η2p =  .08), post-hoc 
Bonferroni analyses did not find any statistical differences between the age groups (ps > .07; 7/8-
year-olds: M = 0.30; 11/12-year-olds: M = 0.28; adults: M = 0.10). Our Bayes Factor(10) was also 
very small (=1.26) which again suggests that our data are more in line with the null than 
alternative hypothesis. To test whether any unrelated intrusions resulting from a response bias 
might be more present in children than in adults, we conducted a univariate ANOVA on the 
intrusion rates during the individual recall phase. A statistically significant age effect was 
observed (F(2, 86) = 14.70, p < .001, η2p =  .26) with younger children (M = 3.52, SD = 3.01) 
having statistically higher intrusion rates than older children (M = 1.57, SD = 1.52; p = .001) and 
adults (M = 0.77, SD = 0.90, p < .001; Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 
False Memory as a Function of Age and Emotion (Means and Standard Errors (in parentheses; 
Experiment 2). 
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Exploratory Analyses  
Because of the possibility of a response bias, we also explored age effects in memory 
conformity for corrected false memory scores. Specifically, we transformed the false memory 
data (collaborative and individual) using the following formula: zscore-False Memory minus zscore-
Intrusion. Intrusions provided by participants could vary on many dimensions and hence, we 
examined age effects on the corrected and combined false memory scores of neutral and negative 
stimuli.  
For the corrected collaborative false memory scores, a univariate ANOVA with Age as 
between-subjects factor was performed. Our analysis showed a developmental reversal effect 
(F(1, 87) = 15.94, p < .001,  ŋ²partial = .27) with 7/8-year-olds (M = -3.21, SD = 3.06) having 
statistically lower corrected false memory scores than 11/12-year-olds (M = -1.19, SD = 2.21; p 
= .002) and adults (M = .01, SD = 0.84; p < .001). 
For the corrected individual false recall scores, we conducted a univariate ANOVA with 
Age as between-subjects factor. Our analysis evinced a developmental reversal effect (F(1, 70) = 
9.61, p = .003,  ŋ²partial = .12). That is, Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons showed that adults (M = 
--0.87, SD = 1.13) had higher corrected false memory scores than younger children (M = -4.13, 
SD = 3.71; p < .001). Corrected false memory scores were also statistically higher in older (M = -
1.73, SD = 1.99) than younger children (p = .001). Adults’ and older children’s corrected false 
memory scores did not statistically differ (p = .57).2 
In Experiment 2, we modified the memory conformity paradigm by presenting children 
and adults with neutral and negative pictures with an obvious theme (e.g., desk) containing 
associatively-related details. The reasoning behind this was that, just as in the DRM paradigm, 
the presentation of associatively-related stimuli would change the typical developmental trend in 
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suggestion-induced false memories (age-related decrease). That is, when children and adults 
receive such associatively-related stimuli and are presented with suggestion, children will not be 
more susceptible to suggestion than adults. Instead, children can benefit from such obvious 
themes thereby being equally vulnerable to false memory development as adults (Otgaar et al., 
2014). Moreover, such an adapted procedure might even result in developmental reversals with 
adults being more susceptible to suggestion-induced false memories than children (Brainerd et 
al., 2008; Otgaar et al., 2016).  
As anticipated, in Experiment 2 we found evidence that when participants were presented 
with associatively-related stimuli consisting of obvious themes, children were equally 
susceptible to memory conformity effects as adults. This effect was most evident for the 
collaborative recall phase. This is in line with previous research showing that developmental 
trends can become attenuated when stimuli with obvious themes are presented to subjects (e.g., 
Howe & Wilkinson, 2011; Otgaar et al., 2014). More interestingly, when we explored the 
transformed false memory scores by correcting for a possible response bias, our analyses showed 
a reversal effect where adults’ false memory scores were least affected by response bias.  
 
General Discussion 
 The current experiments were designed to assess whether the usual developmental trend 
in suggestion-based false memories could be changed. Specifically, research has revealed that 
when presented with suggestive pressure, children are more prone to false memories than adults 
(Bruck & Ceci, 1999). Such patterns have been found in many different false memory 
procedures including the misinformation paradigm (Otgaar et al., 2010). In the current 
experiments, we adapted two frequently used false memory procedures – misinformation and 
SUGGESTIBILITY AND MEMORY CONFORMITY 
 
 24 
memory conformity – in such way that we could test whether this usual developmental trend in 
false memories can be changed. What we have demonstrated is that these typical developmental 
trends in suggestion-induced false memories are indeed malleable. That is, in both experiments, 
we found that children were equally susceptible to false memories as adults and when bias-
corrected scores are used, children were less vulnerable to memory illusions produced through 
conformity effects than were adults.  
 Examining the malleability of developmental trends in suggestion-induced false 
memories is relevant because another type of false memory, spontaneous false memories, 
exhibits the opposite developmental trajectory. That is, numerous studies have demonstrated a 
developmental reversal in which children are less likely to produce false memories than adults 
(see for an overview, Brainerd et al., 2008). This effect has been anticipated by theories such as 
FTT (Brainerd et al., 2008) and AAT (Howe et al., 2009; Otgaar et al., 2014). Both of these 
theories have fleshed out the conditions needed to reveal a developmental reversal effect, 
conditions that include developmental improvements in meaning extraction and associative 
activation. Studies showing this reversal effect have commonly used meaning related materials, 
such as those found in the DRM paradigm, where children, because of their difficulty with 
extracting meaning and lower levels of associative activation, are less likely to form false 
memories than adults.  
We adapted the misinformation and memory conformity procedure in line with principles 
behind the DRM paradigm.  By doing so, we made sure that false memories induced by 
misinformation were predominantly the result of relying on the associative structure and 
meaning of an experience and not because of external factors such as social pressure. 
Specifically, in our experiments, we made sure participants were presented with associatively-
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related stimuli (i.e., stories (Experiment 1); pictures (Experiment 2)) and were then presented 
with suggestions that preserved the underlying theme or meaning of the stimuli. Our prediction, 
derived from AAT and FTT, was that this new procedure would lead to developmental reversals 
in suggestibility effects. Furthermore, AAT postulates that the presentation of stimuli with 
obvious themes would also lead to false memory attenuation effects (no statistical difference in 
false memories between children and adults). 
 The current experiments extended these principles and demonstrated that when children 
and adults are given associatively-related (DRM) materials in the form of stories and are then 
presented with misinformation containing the non-presented critical lure of the stories, 
misinformation effects were equally likely to occur in children and adults (Experiment 1). 
Obviously, this finding runs counter to the usual finding that misinformation effects are more 
prevalent in children than in adults (e.g., Otgaar et al., 2010; Sutherland & Hayne, 2001). It is 
important to emphasize that when we conducted the pilot study for Experiment 1, we showed 
that these same stories without any misinformation exhibited the usual developmental reversal 
effect (age-related increases in false memories). When we added misinformation to this 
procedure we were able to eliminate these age differences, showing that misinformation effects 
do not necessarily occur more often in children than in adults.  
 Experiment 2 used an adapted memory conformity procedure to foster suggestion-
induced false memories. Younger and older children and adults were presented with pictures of 
scenes (e.g., desk) containing associatively-related details. Participants believed they were 
viewing the same pictures whereas in fact the pictures diverged on certain critical items. 
Participants had to report what they could remember of these pictures during both a collaborative 
and an individual recall phase. Again, we found that memory conformity effects were similar in 
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all age groups. Moreover, when we explored bias-corrected false memory scores, we found that 
adults had higher corrected scores than children suggesting the presence of a developmental 
reversal. One potential explanation for this effect was that adults’ false memory scores were less 
affected by response bias than children’s. Of course, we mentioned earlier that previous 
developmental memory conformity work has revealed inconsistent results (Candel et al., 2007; 
McGuire et al., 2015) with one study finding an age-related decrease for cued recall (Candel et 
al., 2007) and another study finding no developmental differences (McGuire et al., 2015). 
However, in McGuire and colleagues’ study, they used a restricted age range and in Candel et 
al.’s research, no control was present concerning whether the stimuli were associatively-related 
to each other. In our second study, we attempted to solve these issues, but of course future 
research should be conducted to test whether our memory conformity results can be replicated.  
  A subsidiary aim of the present experiments was to examine developmental reversal 
effects in neutral and negative false memories. Previous research has found that reversal effects 
emerge independent of the emotional nature of stimuli (Brainerd, Holliday, Reyna, Yang, & 
Toglia, 2010; Howe, Candel, Otgaar, & Malone, 2010). However, most of this research has 
focused exclusively on emotion and developmental reversal effects in spontaneous false 
memories. There is only limited knowledge on whether emotionally-charged stimuli 
differentially affects developmental reversal effects in suggestion-induced false memories (but 
see Otgaar et al., 2016). Our experiments showed that developmental patterns in false memory 
occurred irrespective of the emotional nature of the stimuli. Furthermore, we found that negative 
false memories were more easily elicited than neutral false memories, a finding that aligns well 
with observations showing that it is easier to extract meaning from negative experiences (Rivers, 
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Reyna, & Mills, 2008) or that associative activation spreads faster and more automatically 
through emotionally-negative memories (Howe et al., 2010).  
 Our attenuation and reversal effects in suggestion-induced false memories can be 
explained by AAT and FTT. For our effects in the memory conformity paradigm, when children 
and adults were presented with associatively-related stimuli and received suggestion preserving 
the theme of the event, adults were more likely to extract the underlying meaning or make 
relations with other (related) concepts than children. This resulted in higher false memory levels 
in adults than in children. Our attenuation effects may be due to the effect of themes on false 
memory development. That is, the themes of the stimuli that we used (stories and pictures) can 
easily be identified. When, for example, a picture of a bicycle accident is presented, participants 
can easily see what the picture is about. However, children’s knowledge base is less well-
developed than adults and hence, children benefit more from such themes than adults who 
already have sufficient knowledge concerning those themes (Carneiro, Fernandez, & Dias, 
2009). The consequence of making themes more obvious is that false memory rates will increase 
in children whose knowledge base and meaning extraction skills are worse than those for adults, 
thereby attenuating the usual development trend (increases) in false memory production. 
It might be argued that our experiments are somewhat limited because we used rather 
simple stimuli to investigate developmental reversals in suggestion-induced false memories. 
However, our experiments were purely focused on using theoretical principles (e.g., meaning 
extraction, associative activation) in order to alter developmental trajectories in false memories. 
Therefore, although we may have used rather simple stimuli, these stimuli were ideal for our 
main goal as we had considerable control over the construction of these stimuli. Furthermore, we 
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have recently used more ecologically valid and forensically-oriented stimuli (negative videos) 
and have also obtained developmental reversals in false memory rates (Otgaar et al., 2016).   
The core message of the current experiments is that age trends in false memories are not 
developmentally invariant and that they can be altered quite easily. This is relevant because it 
confirms the importance of using theoretical tenets when predicting forensically-relevant 
developmental patterns of false memory and evaluating the reliability of eyewitness memory. 
Legal professionals and memory researchers have long thought that because of their increased 
proneness to false memories, children make unreliable witnesses (see also Wolffram, 2015). 
However, evidence is accumulating that age, by itself, cannot be used to predict false memory 
propensity (Brainerd, Reyna, & Zember, 2011; Otgaar et al., 2016). Instead, our research 
suggests that other factors should be taken into account when, for example, legal professionals 
(e.g., police) want to assess a witness’ vulnerability to false memories. One likely candidate is to 
assess the witness’ knowledge base , something that could be measured using the DRM 
paradigm. Interestingly, in legal cases, proneness to suggestive questions is often estimated by 
providing the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (Gudjonsson, 1984). Along those lines, it would 
be relevant to examine whether the DRM paradigm might lead to a valid index of someone’s 
knowledge base and susceptibility to false memories. Indeed, there is some research suggesting 
that DRM false memories are positively related to suggestion-based false memories (Zhu, Chen, 
Loftus, Lin, & Dong; but see also Ost, Blank, Davies, Jones, Lambert, & Salmon, 2013; Otgaar 
& Candel, 2011).   
 To conclude, the present experiments show that increased susceptibility to suggestion and 
false memories is not a unique feature of children. On the contrary, we have shown that both 
children and adults can be highly vulnerable for the formation of suggestion-induced false 
SUGGESTIBILITY AND MEMORY CONFORMITY 
 
 29 
memories. Such findings are significant as they provide a more balanced picture of the reliability 
of eyewitness statements and show that children are not by definition inferior witnesses.  
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Footnote 
1We refer to spontaneously-induced false memories when false memories are not induced 
through external (suggestive) pressure but occur because of reliance on associative activation or 
gist extraction  
2Participants also received 5 DRM lists and a recall task. Our analysis evinced a developmental 
reversal effect (F(1, 70) = 9.61, p = .003,  ŋ²partial = .12). 
